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Abstract—The main goal of this paper is to showcase some
results from a comprehensive data analysis that we did on the
cache of chat logs from the notorious ransomware group Conti.
The chat logs were made publicly available on February 27, 2022.
They were translated from Russian into English, and contain
393 json files with chat logs from the instant messaging service
Jabber. We employ a variety of modern data science tools for
text mining, natural language processing, network analysis and
geospatial analysis to investigate the Conti chat logs so that
we can understand the command and control structure of the
network and discover any valuable information hidden in the
data, such as Bitcoin, IP, email and web addresses, as well as
any other information that can lead to further insights into the
inner workings of the Conti group.
Index Terms—Conti group, ransomware, text mining, natural
language processing, network analysis, geospatial analysis.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Large collections of text or email messages exchanged
among users of an instant messaging or email service are
often too big for any group of analysts to read them carefully
and completely. Therefore, computational tools are needed
to better understand the overall structure of the texts, mine
valuable information, find particularly important documents,
discover the networks and the key actors who are central to
these networks and their command and control structure.
In this article we showcase selected results from a comprehensive analysis of the Conti chat logs, released on February
27, 2022 by the Twitter account ContiLeaks, which posted
links to an archive of chat messages taken from Conti’s private
communications infrastructure, dating between January 29,
2021 and February 27, 2022 [7].
We developed workflows for text mining, document-term
analysis, network analysis and spatial analysis of IP addresses
in the context of the Conti data. This allowed us to mine
valuable information such as Bitcoin wallet addresses and
IP addresses, which we were able to geolocate by crossreferencing the IP2Location database [12], and map across the
globe. We also created correlation, centrality, and community
networks of top Conti users, including centrality networks of
Conti actors who exchanged encrypted messages and Bitcoin
wallet addresses so that we can better understand the command
and control structure of the Conti group.

We did a comprehensive literature review, but we could
not find any papers in the peer-reviewed academic literature
dedicated to analyzing the Conti chat logs. We found a journal
paper [3] just published, analyzing the Conti ransomware
source codes that were also leaked on February 27, 2022. We
did find a number of news articles and blog posts describing
the results of their analysis of the Conti chat logs, without
discussing the specific workflows they used, see [1], [10]. We
reproduced two graphs in [10], one showing the average number of messages sent per day, and a second one showing the
number of messages sent by users who sent over 100 messages
in total, partially validating our data analysis workflows.
We implemented all text analysis and visualizations using
the R programming language [18], and the tidyverse
collection of R packages [27], in R Markdown and Quarto
notebooks [17], [19], [29] in RStudio. We used [4], [25],
[28] as general references on data science with R. We adapted
various text mining techniques from [22], which we applied to
the Conti data. For singular value decomposition and its many
applications to information retrieval, we used the references
[5], [14], [23], [24].
II. DATA C OLLECTION AND P ROCESSING
On February 27, 2022, just 3 days after Russia invaded
Ukraine, an Ukrainian Conti insider published a cache of chat
logs with conversations between members of the notorious
ransomware group Conti. The Conti chat logs were released
in Russian as 393 json files [7]. Bill Demirkapi [9], a major in
computing security at the Rochester Institute of Technology,
shared on Twitter a version of the Conti chat logs translated
into English. An English translation has also been done by
Northwave [20]. We should note that the English translations
were done using Google Translate, which is not the same as
being translated by expert translators. We had to re-format the
json files so that we could parse and merge them into a single
dataframe with 4 variables, ts (time stamp), from (email), to
(email), and body (text message).
III. T EXT M INING
There are 60,800 messages sent between 1/29/2021 and
2/27/2022. The number of unique users who sent messages
is 267. There are 71 users who received messages but never

TABLE III: Users Who Sent and Received Bitcoin Addresses

Fig. 1: A barplot of users who sent at least 400 messages.

User

Received

Sent

stern
mango
defender
twin
tramp
viper
veron
carter
many
begemot
salamandra

139
119
16
12
11
8
6
0
0
0
0

2
47
0
0
4
11
11
46
39
24
17

TABLE I: Encrypted Messages Sent and Received
TABLE IV: The Most Mentioned Websites
User

Sent

Received

defender
driver
veron
hof
grom
specter
ghost
green
buza

6122
3366
2209
2025
1058
434
87
75
34

7422
2805
1945
184
699
401
121
77
49

TABLE II: Pairs With the Most Encrypted Messages
Pair

Encrypted Messages

driver-defender
veron-defender
defender-driver
defender-veron
hof-defender
defender-hof
grom-defender
defender-grom
specter-driver
driver-specter

2593
2171
2011
1912
1533
1417
1049
697
434
401

sent any messages. The number of unique users who received
messages is 335. In Figure 1, we show the top users with the
most messages sent. We found 15,415 encrypted messages,
which is about 25% of all messages. There are only 33 directed
pairs of users who have exchanged encrypted messages. We
show the top 9 in Table I. In Table II, we show the top pairs
of users who exchanged the most encrypted messages.
We found 385 texts containing Bitcoin wallet addresses and
we extracted 278 unique Bitcoin addresses. We searched for
Bitcoin addresses using regular expressions, and the general
rule for a Bitcoin address, which must start with 1 or 3, or bc1,
and has between 26 and 64 characters. Three users, mango,
carter, and many sent the most Bitcoin addresses, 33, 31,
and 29, respectively, all to stern, and stern received the
most Bitcoin addresses. The top users who sent and received
the most Bitcoin addresses are shown in Table III.

Website

Mentions

privnote.com
privatlab.com
sendspace.com
zoominfo.com
protonmail.com
web.core.windows.net
topcashback.co.uk
dyncheck.com
gmail.com
outlook.com
dropmefiles.com
shell.com

319
169
39
22
17
15
14
13
12
12
11
11

For text mining purposes, we remove the daily duplicates
and keep only letters and digits. Then, we unnest all messages
in the data into single words and remove all stopwords so that
we can focus on the more important words that could reveal
meaningful topics. Unnesting the messages into single terms
makes it easier to filter important words, such as websites, nononion emails, Bitcoin wallet addresses, IP addresses, etc. For
example, in Table IV, we show the most mentioned websites
that we mined from the texts using regular expressions.
A. Document-term Analysis
The importance of a term t within a document d can be
measured by the term frequency tf(t, d), which is simply the
relative frequency of term t within a document d:
ft,d
,
′
t′ ∈d ft ,d

tf(t, d) = P

(1)

where ft,d is the number of times term t occurs in document d.
Note that the denominator in (1) represents the total number of
terms in document d, counted by adding the raw frequencies of
the individual terms. A more complex and useful statistic for
the importance of a term is the inverse document frequency,
which measures how common or rare a term is across all
documents in the corpus. It is the logarithmically scaled
inverse fraction of the documents that contain the term:

(a) The top words for key actors.

(b) The top bigrams for key actors.

Fig. 2: Sorted unigrams and bigrams for key actors based on the tf-idf statistic.
TABLE V: Correlation Table
N
idf(t, D) = ln
,
|{d ∈ D : t ∈ d}|

(2)

where N = |D| is the total number of documents in the
document collection D, and the denominator in (2) is the
number of documents that contain term t. Note that we are
computing the idf(t, D) only for terms that are in the corpus of
documents, thus there is no risk of the denominator being zero.
The idf(t, D) statistic decreases the weight for commonly used
terms in the corpus of documents, and increases the weight
for terms that are not as common. The product of tf(t, d) and
idf(t, D) is known as the tf-idf statistic, and it is a useful
measure for the frequency of a term adjusted for how rarely
it is used across the corpus of documents. It is intended to
measure how important a term is to a document in a corpus
of documents, and it has proved useful in text mining, search
engines, etc. Information theory researchers have proposed a
probability-weighted amount of information (PWI) measure
that is based on an information-theoretic view of information
retrieval, and it corresponds well to the tf-idf measure [2].
In this context, tf-idf measures how important a word is
to the collection of chat logs for any given user, being a single
document, relative to the corpus of all chat collections for all
users. We define a “document” to be the collection of all text
messages sent by a given user, since the median length of a
text message is only 4 words (the average length is 9.3 words,
and the maximum length is 924 words). Most text messages
are very short, but we extracted all long (more than 30 words)
text messages and put them in an interactive data table using
the DT package, so that they can be searched and read inside an
html report or an html presentation. In Figure 2a, we visualize
the most important words with the highest tf-idf values for
key users. We also created bigrams for selected users, shown
in Figure 2b. We used [22], [28] as references for text mining
and data analysis with R, and the R packages in the tidyverse
collection [27], as well as [21].
B. Wordclouds for Key Actors
We performed term-frequency analysis on the word dictionaries for all users, and created wordclouds for key actors,

Has term X
No term X
Total

Has term Y

No term Y

Total

n11
n01
n·1

n10
n00
n·0

n1·
n0·
n

based on their most frequently used words. In Figure 3, we
show the wordclouds for stern and salamandra that we created using the wordcloud package [11]. Stern appears to be
talking a lot to tom, mango, professor, and buza. He is very
interested in crypto trends, blockchain technology, trick bots,
etc. Salamandra appears to be the HR person, dealing with
resumes, interviewing candidates via the software recruitment
company hh.ru, negotiating salaries of 150K, presumably in
rubles per month, which was about $2000 in May 2021.
IV. N ETWORK A NALYSIS
A. Correlation Networks
For the purpose of creating networks, we kept the duplicate
messages since they reveal connections among the users.
The first type of networks that we created were correlation
networks, which can help us discover users similar to each
other in terms of text content, thus probably having similar
duties. The correlation among words indicates how often they
appear together relative to how often they appear separately,
and it is measured by the phi coefficient (ϕ), a common measure of correlation between two binary variables. In machine
learning, it is known as the Matthews correlation coefficient
(MCC), and it is used as a measure of the quality of binary
classifications. The Pearson correlation coefficient computed
for two binary variables yields the phi coefficient. It provides
useful information about how much more likely it is that either
both terms X and Y appear, or neither do, than that one
appears without the other.
Consider Table V for the correlation setup. In this table, n11
represents the number of documents where both term X and
term Y appear, n00 is the number of documents neither term
appears, and n10 and n01 the cases where one term appears
without the other. Based on this table, the phi coefficient is:

(a) A wordcloud for stern.

(b) A wordcloud for salamandra.

Fig. 3: Wordclouds for two key actors, stern the boss, and salamandra, the HR.

measures. One way to think is that a node is important not only
because it contains valuable information, but also because it
links to other important nodes. We use Kleinberg’s authority
centrality scores of the vertices, defined as the components of
the principal eigenvector of AAT , where A = (Aij ) is the
adjacency matrix of the graph. One can think of authorities
and hubs as follows: a node is an authority if it is highly coreferenced with other authorities; a node is a hub if it highly
co-references other hubs. More specifically, let the authority
centrality scores for all nodes be given by the vector x, and
the hub centrality scores for all nodes be given by the vector
y. The centrality vectors satisfy the matrix relations:

Fig. 4: A network for correlations stronger than 0.45.

x
y
n11 n00 − n10 n01
ϕ= √
.
n1· n0· n·0 n·1

(3)

After we unnest all messages into word tokens and filter
out stopwords, we can group the data by users and words
and count the frequencies for each user-word pair. Then, for
each pair of users we can compute the correlation between the
vectors of word frequencies for the two users. The dataframe
with all pairs of users and the corresponding correlation values
can be used to create a correlation network where the users
form the nodes, and the pairwise correlations represent the
strength of the edges between the pairs of nodes. We can then
filter the pairs of users to keep only the stronger correlations
(above 45%), and we can visualize them in a correlation
network, as shown in Figure 4. We used the R packages [8],
[15], [16], [21] for implementing all networks.
B. Centrality Networks
Next, we create a centrality network for key actors. The
centrality of a network node measures the importance of
the node in the network. There are many different centrality

= αAy
= βAT x,

(4)

with α, β = const. Combing the two gives the system:
AAT x
AT Ay

=
=

λx
λy,

(5)

where λ = (αβ)−1 . Thus, authority and hub centralities are
given by eigenvectors of AAT and AT A, respectively, with
the same eigenvalue λ. If we want the centrality scores to
be non-negative, we have to take the principal eigenvector
corresponding to the largest (most positive) eigenvalue, according to the Perron–Frobenius Theorem. In Figure 5, we
show the centrality network we created using Kleinberg’s
centrality measure, for all pairs of users who exchanged at
least 100 messages.
C. Network Clustering
In addition, we clustered the network of top pairs of
users into communities, using the InfoMap algorithm from
the igraph package [8], which is an example of an optimal
community detection algorithm that searches the space of
graph partitions to find the partition that optimizes a certain

Fig. 5: A centrality network for pairs of users who exchanged
at least 100 messages.

Fig. 7: A centrality network of users who exchanged at least
5 BTC wallet addresses.

Fig. 6: Network clustering of pairs of users who exchanged at
least 100 messages.

Fig. 8: A centrality network of users who exchanged encrypted
messages.

quality function. The community network that we created is
shown in Figure 6. We also used a clustering algorithm based
on the leading non-negative eigenvector of the modularity
matrix M = (Mij ) of the network graph, defined by:
di dj
,
(6)
2m
where di is the degree of vertex i, and m is the number of
edges in the graph. This spectral clustering algorithm produced
a network similar to Figure 6, but with 10 communities. A
good tutorial on spectral clustering can be found in [26].
Mij = Aij −

D. A Bitcoin Network
We created a Bitcoin centrality network of the pairs of users
who exchanged Bitcoin wallet addresses, using Kleinberg’s
centrality measure, see Figure 7. User stern appears to be the
CEO of the Conti group, based on everything we learned from
the data, mango seems to be the CFO/COO, and he collects
the most Bitcoin wallet addresses, presumably from the team
leaders, and sends them to stern to distribute the BTC
payments. The dozen people in the immediate neighborhood
of mango are most likely team leaders. Stern also has half
a dozen people in his immediate neighborhood, most likely
senior leadership. There are two disconnected components,
tramp-bio (negotiators, bloggers) and buza-veron (developer
leads). Salamandra is the HR, and together with mango they
are key structural nodes in the network, besides the big boss

Fig. 9: The mined IP addresses mapped across the globe.

stern. We also created a Bitcoin clustering network based
on the leading eigenvector algorithm, but it turned out to be
identical to the centrality network.
E. A Network of Encrypted Messages
This network is based on the 33 pairs of actors who sent
to each other encrypted messages. We created a centrality
network, using Kleinberg’s centrality measure, and it appears
that defender plays a central role, with driver and hof the
next most central actors in the network, see Figure 8.
V. G EOLOCATING IP A DDRESSES
Using regular expressions, we mined the IP addresses from
the chat logs. We then used the IP2Location [12] database
to identify the geographical locations (latitude, longitude,

TABLE VI: Top 10 Countries with Conti IP Addresses
Country

Count

USA
Netherlands
UK
Russia
India
Bulgaria
Bangladesh
Germany
Lithuania
Canada

116
36
19
16
12
11
10
10
9
7

TABLE VII: Top 10 Cities with Conti IP Addresses
City

Count

Amsterdam
Sofia
London
Meppel
Siauliai
Dhaka
Riga
Naaldwijk
Los Angeles
Douglas, UK

15
11
10
10
9
7
7
7
7
6

TABLE VIII: Top 10 US Cities with Conti IP Addresses
City

Count

Los Angeles
Las Vegas
San Jose
Sheridan
Williamsville
Chicago
Kansas City
Miami
New York City
Seattle

7
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3

country, and city) for each IP address. Using the obtained
longitudes and latitudes, we mapped the IP addresses across
the globe using the leaflet package [6], see Figure 9.
In Table VI, we show the top 10 countries in terms of the
highest number of IP addresses mined from the Conti chat
logs, which we geolocated using the IP2Location database.
The top 10 cities with the highest number of Conti IP addresses
are listed in Table VII. It appears that some of the IP addresses
that we geolocated in Europe are related to the Conti VPN
servers that help them stay online anonymously. In Europe,
Sofia (Bulgaria) dominates Eastern Europe, while Amsterdam
and London dominate Western Europe, in terms of the IP
addresses we mined from the Conti chat logs. We filtered out
the IP addresses located in the US, and the top 10 cities are
listed in Table VIII.

VI. K EY C ONTI ACTORS
Using the network analysis that we developed, we can
start building the organizational chart of the Conti network,
based on the centrality and the community clustering networks.
We believe that the Bitcoin centrality network captures team
leaders who manage the Bitcoin transactions for salaries and
expenses. Of course, reading the texts is crucially important to
better understand the roles of the actors in the proper context.
We briefly mention only select actors. The CEO of Conti
appears to be stern. He is tasking team leaders and paying
teams’ salaries with Bitcoins. Stern wants to build a social
network for darknet users on the top of a private blockchain,
fully developed and controlled by Conti. Stern is also very interested in trading and creating their own crypto system, and he
discusses several types, etherium, polkadot and binance smart
chain. Stern wants to build on the top of their blockchain,
NFT, DeFi, DEX etc. In Stern’s own words:
“. . . and all the new trends that are and will be. So that
others can already create their own coins, exchanges and
projects on our system . . . Here, under this social network,
you can realize all your erotic fantasies in one place, both
the exchange and file storage in the blockchain . . . The
works are gigantic volumes, without the experience of
administration we ourselves will not pull, I think that we
need to attract some kind of colleagues, like xss . . . this
will be the evolution of our underground into something
more serious.”

It appears that Conti members have been involved in pumpand-dump crypto scams. Below is a text from user ghost sent
to user neo on 10/31/21:
“The big day has arrived. 24 hours remaining until the
biggest pump signal of all time! The target this time will
be around 400% gains possibly even more. We will be
targeting 100 million $ volume. With the bull market being
in full effect and volumes being high, the odds of reaching
400% profit will be very high once again. We will do
everything in our power to make sure we reach this target,
if you have missed our previous big successful pumps, this
is also the one you will not want to miss. A massive pump
is about to begin in only 24 hours, be prepared.”

Another key actor is mango who appears to play the role
of the CFO/COO of Conti. He collects Bitcoin addresses
from team leaders and sends them to stern for payment.
He has taken on the responsibility to fulfill stern’s wishlist.
The Conti group has an HR Department led by salamandra
who appears to be in charge of interviewing candidates for
job assignments with the Conti group. She (most likely) is
organizing the onboarding and negotiating salaries with candidates. Salamandra uses legitimate recruiting services offered
by https://hh.ru/, where she gets the resumes from, looking
for people with the right coding skills and background that
fit the needs of Conti. New hires do not realize immediately
who their employer really is. The actors tramp and bio
appear to be involved with ransom negotiations and blogging
about ransomware attacks. Bio writes about their targets and
captured data, and it is his responsibility to provide the
decryptor key to the victims once they pay the ransom.

VII. C ONCLUSION
The main goal of our research project was to develop a
modern data science workflow for analyzing the Conti data
so that we can better understand the command and control
structure of the Conti ransomware network, and mine valuable
information. The primary research objectives of this project
were supplemented by secondary educational objectives related to developing innovative educational materials and activities, inspired by the various data science techniques that
we explored. We are in the process of developing educational
modules that can be used in courses on data science, natural language processing, network analysis and geographical
mapping. Similar workflows and data science techniques can
be adapted with some modifications for investigating other
similarly structured data sets related to criminal activities
across the cyberspace.
VIII. DATA AND C ODE AVAILABILITY
We have extracted and merged the Conti data from the
original 393 json files into a single csv file, which we have
published on GitHub [13]. We also published on GitHub some
of the data we mined from the Conti chat logs, including
the full list of websites, Bitcoin and IP addresses, along with
the geolocations of the IP addresses that we mined by crossreferencing the IP2Location database. We are in the process
of preparing journal articles, educational modules, and handson tutorials, which will cover the implementation side of
this project. We plan to make our code available and all
workflows fully reproducible inside Quarto notebooks that
we will provide, as part of our future publications. This will
allow for all data science techniques and workflows that we
developed for the implementation of this project to be quickly
adapted for other similar investigations.
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